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Abstract
We show how it is possible to operate end-to-end relays on a QKD
network by treating each relay as a trusted eavesdropper operating an
intercept/resend strategy. It is shown that, by introducing the concept
of ‘bit transport’, the key rate compared to that of single-link channels
is unaffected. The technique of bit transport extends the capability of
QKD networks. We also discuss techniques for reducing the level of trust
required in the relays. In particular we demonstrate that it is possible
to create a simple quantum key exchange scheme using secret sharing
such that by the addition of a single extra relay on a multi-relay channel
requires the eavesdropper to compromise all the relays on the channel. By
coupling this with multi-path capability and asynchronous quantum key
establishment we show that, in effect, an eavesdropper has to compromise
all relays on an entire network and collect data on the entire network from
its inception.
1 Introduction
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is an elegant and ingenious application of
quantum mechanics to the problem of key establishment in classical cryptosys-
tems (see [1,2] for the 2 seminal works that established the two basic methods
of QKD; for some excellent reviews of QKD see [3]). Its principal limitation, in
practical terms, is the distance over which it is possible to exchange the keys
securely. Whilst the security of the technique is robust to loss, detector imperfec-
tions mean that even modest amounts of loss, such as that seen in optical fibres,
can limit the distance of the technique over a single channel. Any widespread
implementation of QKD must, of course, operate on a network, and this intro-
duces further complications. Active processing of any quantum signal will, in
general, destroy the integrity of the quantum states and render quantum key
exchange impossible. QKD works beautifully on passive optical networks [4,5],
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but passive network switching elements can also be seen as effectively introduc-
ing further loss, thus adding to the difficulty of operating a QKD network over
the distances that might be required in any realistic network implementation.
The current design of QKD network trials (see, for example, [6]) adopt an
approach based on relay nodes operated in a link-by-link fashion in order to
extend the distance (we use the terminology ‘LL relays’ to describe such link-
by-link operation). Whilst this is an eminently practical solution to the problem
of extending the distance of any QKD scheme it is preferable, from a security
perspective, to have the capability of exchanging end-to-end keys between any
two network users. Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Pasquinucci [7] show how, by
considering a relay to be a trusted eavesdropper operating a standard inter-
cept/resend strategy, it is possible to construct such an end-to-end relay (we
shall use the term ‘IR relays’ to describe these). It is argued in [7] that such
relays cannot be used, however, to extend the distance for a QKD channel. By
a suitable adaptation of the operation of these IR relays we show here how,
contrary to this conclusion, it is indeed possible to use such relays to extend the
distance.
Both LL and IR relays must be trusted network elements and this, to some
extent, reduces the attractiveness of the technology. After all, perhaps the most
compelling feature of single link QKD is to allow key exchange in a provably-
secure fashion. We discuss techniques for reducing the level of trust required
in such relay solutions. In particular, we show that by adding in redundancy
at the relay level, we can construct channels in which an eavesdropper has to
compromise all of the relays. The implication of this is that our network users,
Alice and Bob, only need to be able to trust at least one relay on such channels1.
A naive application of IR relays would suggest that each relay reduces the
effective key rate by a factor of 2 from the key rate that can be achieved by
single link QKD. This exponential reduction in key rate as we add more relays is
catastrophic for our original goal of extending the distance. By introducing the
notion of bit transport we show that, in fact, the single link QKD rate can be
achieved over channels with any number of relays. Bit transport is a powerful
classical post-processing technique that can be used to extend the flexibility and
capability of QKD networks [8] and we discuss some applications here, including
the ability of Alice and Bob to perform eavesdropper detection on a duplex QKD
channel without the necessity of public bit comparison.
2 Intercept-Resend Relays
An IR relay as envisioned in [7] acts precisely as an eavesdropper performing an
intercept/resend strategy on each transmitted quantum state. The relay chooses
at random one of the coding bases used by Alice for each timeslot and simply
retransmits the state corresponding to the measurement result. The difference
between an eavesdropper and the relay is that now we consider the relay to
1Some preliminary results were presented at the IEEE GCC Conference, Dubai, UAE
(2011)
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be a cooperative entity on the network. We can also view the action of the
relay as another network user, such as Bob, whose function is to re-transmit
the measured result to the next network user. One of the nice features of using
relays in IR mode is that we do not have to consider a single dedicated path
between Alice and Bob, but can consider the establishment of the shared key on
multiple distinct paths between them on the network. This feature alone allows
us to put less trust in any individual path and the relays on that path. When
this is combined with the technique of secret-sharing we can reduce the level of
trust required in any individual relay still further [9,10]. We shall discuss the
issue of trust as it applies to the relay nodes of a quantum network later.
We shall assume the coding bases used are represented by the operators Xˆ
and Yˆ which have eigenstates |±〉X and |±〉Y , respectively, and we adopt the
coding interpretation |+〉 ≡ 1 and |−〉 ≡ 0. Thus, the quantum key is to be
established using the BB84 protocol [1]. We shall label the relays on a channel
by Rj and the two users who wish to establish a key, Alice and Bob, by A and
B, respectively. The distance between A and B is such that a quantum key
cannot be successfully established by single link QKD. A channel between Alice
and Bob with a single relay is of the form
A −→ R −→ B
The possible transmissions on the channel, when Alice chooses to use the coding
basis represented by Xˆ , can be split into the 4 cases shown in the table below
Alice R Bob
X X X
X Y X
X X Y
X Y Y
with a similar table for the situations in which Alice makes the choice of coding
basis represented by Yˆ . It is clear that a quantum key can be established on the
first of these entries in the table in which we have all 3 parties using the same
coding basis. At first sight this suggests that an IR relay can be used to extend
the distance for key establishment, but at the expense of sacrificing 3/4 of the
transmissions, instead of the loss of 1/2 of the transmissions on filtering that
we would obtain for single link QKD. However, if the channel between Alice
and the relay is already operating at the limit for single link QKD then simple
re-transmission of the measured results by the relay will lead to a quantum
signal between the relay and Bob that is insufficient to overcome the signal-to-
noise limitations at Bob’s detector. Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Pasquinucci [7]
prove that a relay channel operated in this fashion cannot be used to extend
the distance for QKD.
The argument presented in [7] is applicable to the situtation when we think
of the overall channel A→ R→ B as a single channel. The problem is that the
final quantum signal that gets to Bob is too weak to be successfully distinguished
from the detector noise. However, we do not need to operate this as a single
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channel, but can effectively split the communication into 2 separate channels.
In order to overcome the signal-to-noise problem at Bob’s detector we can do
one of two things:
1. The relay delays retransmission until sufficient data has been gathered so
that the signal sent on to Bob is of sufficient strength to overcome the
SNR limitations at Bob’s detector
2. The relay pads the retransmission with a separate QKD communication
between the relay and Bob. The relay can keep track of which timeslots
are from Alice and which are padding qubits. The padding qubits can be
used to establish a separate quantum key between the relay and Bob, if
desired.
Using either of the techniques (1) and (2) we see that we can use IR relays to
successfully extend the distance for quantum key establishment. The apparent
problem with this is that we have halved the key rate between Alice and Bob. It
is clear that the addition of another relay further exacerbates the situation and
each additional relay will introduce a further loss factor of 2 into the final key
rate. However, this reasoning is based on the assumption that only the channels
where all entities have used the same coding basis can be used to establish an
end-to-end key between Alice and Bob. As we shall see in the next section, the
notion of bit transport reveals that this is an unduly restrictive assumption and
that the introduction of relays does not affect the final key rate.
3 Bit Transport
In order to illustrate the technique of bit transport we shall consider a channel
that requires two relays, R1 and R2, to span the distance between A andB. Each
relay is operated in IR mode as described above. The transmission sequence is
schematically described by
A −→ R1 −→ R2 −→ B
In the timeslots where Alice chooses the coding basis X we have the following
possible situations2:
2For the sake of brevity we will simply describe the choice of coding basis by X or Y rather
than using the more cumbersome form ‘the coding basis represented by Xˆ’, for example.
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Alice R1 R2 Bob
1 X X X X
2 X X X Y
3 X X Y X
4 X X Y Y
5 X Y X X
6 X Y X Y
7 X Y Y X
8 X Y Y Y
We can think of the entire transmission (in which Alice chooses the coding basis
X) as being made up of 8 distinct channels, in which each channel occurs at
random in the sequence of timeslots. There is, as discussed previously in the case
of the single-relay channel, an equivalent table describing the situations where
Alice chooses the coding basis Y . Channel 3 in the above table, for example,
represents those instances where relay 1 chooses the coding basis X , relay 2 the
coding basis Y , and Bob chooses the coding basis X .
In full, therefore, we have a complete transmission consisting of N timeslots.
On average, in N/2 of these Alice will choose the coding basis X and the coding
basis Y in the remaining timeslots. Thus the entire transmission can be parti-
tioned into 16 channels, distributed at random in the timeslot sequence, which
represent all of the possible coding choices of the participants. In each times-
lot the participants record a tuple (t, c, b) where t is the index for the timeslot
(which we can simply think of as an integer so that t = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N), c is
the bit representing the choice of coding basis (we adopt the convention that
X ≡ 0 and Y ≡ 1) and b is the actual received/transmitted bit value. Thus in
a timeslot t we have the participants recording the following tuples:
Alice : (t, cA, bA)
Relay 1 : (t, c1, b1)
Relay 2 : (t, c2, b2)
Bob : (t, cB, bB)
The partitioned channels we have described above are generated by the possible
values of the bit string cAc1c2cB. The 8 partitioned channels in the above table
are given by the possible values of the bit string 0c1c2cB. In ideal operation we
therefore have:
cA = c1 ⇒ bA = b1
c1 = c2 ⇒ b1 = b2
c2 = cB ⇒ b2 = bB
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which simply states that if adjacent participants in the channel choose the same
coding basis they will record the same bit value. In other words, if adjacent
users choose the same coding basis then they could establish a quantum key
on that link, if they desired. We describe these links as ‘open’ and links in
which adjacent users have chosen a different coding basis as ‘closed’. Using the
symbol  to denote an open link and the symbol  to denote a closed link the
8 channels in the above table can be rewritten as
1 : XXXX
2 : XXXY
3 : XXYX
4 : XXYY
5 : XYXX
6 : XYXY
7 : XYYX
8 : XYYY
Consider channels 2 and 5. We can see that a quantum key can only propagate
between A, R1 and R2 in timeslots described by channel 2, and only between
R2 and B in timeslots described by channel 5. However, Alice and Bob are only
interested in establishing a shared bit at the end of the process and so R2 can
‘repair’ the broken link by correlating a timeslot from channel 2 configurations
with another timeslot from channel 5 configurations such that the same bit
value is propagated. For example, suppose in timeslots 5 and 12 we have these
configurations, respectively, then we might have the recorded tuples
Alice R1 R2 Bob
Channel 2 (5, 0, 1) (5, 0, 1) (5, 0, 1) (5, 1, 0)
Channel 5 (12, 0, 1) (12, 1, 0) (12, 0, 1) (12, 0, 1)
The relay R2 simply needs to announce to Alice and Bob that Alice should use
the bit value from timeslot 5 and Bob should use the bit value from timeslot 12.
Thus 2 partially closed channels are effectively combined into one open channel
and Alice and Bob can establish a shared bit value by combining their data
in timeslots 5 and 12. Alice ignores her recorded data in timeslot 12 and Bob
ignores his recorded data in timeslot 5.
For each partially closed channel in the above there is a dual channel which
can be used to correlate the data so that a shared bit value can be established
with the assistance of the intermediate relays. There are 6 partially closed
channels, one fully open channel (XXXX) and one fully closed channel
(XYXY ). Thus by transporting bits across broken links in this fashion
we can see that Alice and Bob can establish N/2 shared bits, on average, just
as they would for single link QKD.
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If a partitioned channel is described by the bit string cAc1c2cB then the bit
string for the dual channel is given by
cAc1c2cB ⊕ cAc¯AcAc¯A
where ⊕ is the bitwise exclusive-or of the bit strings and c¯ is the bit complement
of c. This can be extended to the situation with n relays:
A −→ R1 −→ . . . −→ Rn −→ B
where we can partition the data into 2n channels distributed randomly across
the sequence of timeslots. If one of these partitions is described by the bit string
cAc1c2c3 . . . cn−2cn−1cncB then its dual partition is described by
cAc1c2c3 . . . cn−2cn−1cncB ⊕ cAc¯AcAc¯A . . . cAc¯AcAc¯A (n even)
cAc1c2c3 . . . cn−2cn−1cncB ⊕ cAc¯AcAc¯A . . . c¯AcAc¯AcA (n odd)
It is clear that to each partially closed channel there is a single unique dual
channel (also partially closed). The fully-open and fully closed partitions are,
of course, duals of one another. Hence we can see that if there are N timeslots,
then, even with n relays, we can use this bit transport technique over dual
partitions to establish a shared key between Alice and Bob that is, on average,
N/2 bits in length.
Bit transport, as outlined above, is a classical post-processing technique (al-
though it can be performed during the quantum key transmission). When seen
in this perspective we note that we can think of the entire quantum transmission
as a series of N sequential experiments. It is the post-processing of the data
that allows us to establish a shared secret key from this data. This is true of
single link QKD as it is for relay-based schemes. This change of perspective al-
lows us to consider new network operations such as asynchronous quantum key
exchange [8]. Indeed, by considering the data collected on the quantum trans-
missions simply as ‘data’ we might also wish to use the network relay nodes
as a sensitive network monitoring tool where problems with particular paths or
links can be detected and communications re-routed. There is no reason why
we have to use the recorded quantum data only in security applications.
3.1 QKD with Bit Revelation
As an illustration of the application of this perspective of a QKD channel as a
series of sequential experiments coupled with a post-processing technique, we
consider the possibility of key establishment over a quantum channel in which
the bit values are publicly revealed. In the standard operation of QKD the basis
information is revealed and the bit values are kept secret. We show that it is
also possible to establish a shared secret key by revelation of the bit values, but
keeping the basis information secret.
Assuming a lossless channel and ideal detections Alice and Bob will each
possess a set of N tuples {(t, cA, bA)} and {(t, cB, bB)}, respectively. Each of
7
Alice’s tuples contains 2 secret bits of information; the basis bit cA and the
coded bit value bA. In the standard BB84 protocol [1] the basis information
is publicly revealed and a sifting process employed to select only those tuples,
for the same t, where cA = cB. Public examination of a small random sample
of these sifted tuples reveals (under our assumption of ideal conditions) the
presence of an eavesdropper. The possible transmissions and outcomes on a
QKD channel operating the BB84 protocol are shown in the table below in
terms of the recorded tuples (t, c, b) for a given timeslot labelled by t
Alice Bob Probability
(t, 0, 0)A (t, 0, 0)B 1
(t, 1, 0)B 1/2
(t, 1, 1)B 1/2
(t, 0, 1)A (t, 0, 1)B 1
(t, 1, 0)B 1/2
(t, 1, 1)B 1/2
(t, 1, 0)A (t, 1, 0)B 1
(t, 0, 0)B 1/2
(t, 0, 1)B 1/2
(t, 1, 1)A (t, 1, 1)B 1
(t, 0, 0)B 1/2
(t, 0, 1)B 1/2
where the probability refers to the probability that, for the transmitted state,
Bob records that tuple given his measurement basis. At this point everything
is per the usual BB84 protocol and neither basis nor bit information has been
revealed publicly. Let us consider the case where Alice chooses to reveal, for a
given timeslot, the bit value bA, whilst keeping the basis bit cA secret. We shall
suppose that in this timeslot she has recorded the tuple (t, 0, 0)A so that her
revealed bit value is bA = 0. If, in this timeslot, Bob has chosen a basis value
of cB = 0, then he is using the same basis as Alice and he will have recorded
the triple (t, 0, 0)B with unit probability. With Alice’s announcement he knows
that he has measured the correct bit value, but he cannot tell whether Alice’s
tuple is (t, 0, 0)A or (t, 1, 0)A. He knows that with his chosen basis and the
measurement result his tuple is more likey (with a probability of 2/3) to have
been a result of Alice’s tuple (t, 0, 0)A, but he cannot be certain. In other words,
he cannot unambiguously decode his measurement to yield Alice’s secret basis
value if his recorded tuple is (t, 0, 0)B.
If he has chosen a basis value of cB = 1 then his possible tuples resulting
from this choice and Alice’s input tuple are (t, 1, 0)B and (t, 1, 1)B. If he records
the tuple (t, 1, 0)B then his bit value is in agreement with Alice’s revealed bit
but he cannot tell (with equal probability) whether this has arisen from an
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input tuple of (t, 0, 0)A or (t, 1, 0)A. However, if his measurement result yields
the tuple (t, 1, 1)B then he knows with certainty that, with Alice’s revealed bit
value of bA = 0 this could only have arisen from an input tuple of (t, 0, 0)A
and so he knows that Alice’s basis bit (cA = 0) is the complement of his basis
bit (cB = 1). Similar considerations apply for each of Alice’s possible input
tuples so that we can establish the following adapted protocol for quantum key
establishment using the BB84 protocol with bit revelation :
1. Alice chooses a coding basis at random
2. Alice chooses a state from that basis at random
3. For each timeslot Alice transmits her chosen quantum state to Bob
4. Alice records the tuple (t, cA, bA) where t is the timeslot, cA is the coding
basis and bA is the bit value
5. For each timeslot Bob chooses, at random, a coding basis in which to
decode (i.e. measure) the transmitted quantum state
6. Bob records the tuple (t, cB, bB) where cB is Bob’s decoding (measure-
ment) basis and bB is the decoded (measured) bit
7. For each timeslot Alice reveals her value b and Bob compares this with
his value bB and they discard those timeslots in which bA = bB
8. Bob determines the logical complement cB
9. Alice and Bob now have a list in which t, cA and cB are in agreement.
A random sample of these results are chosen and the values c and cB
compared. This gives an estimate of the error rate for the channel. These
compared timeslots are discarded. The remaining values cA = cB can be
used as a key
10. The remaining timeslots can be renumbered for convenience so that t ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n} where n is the total number of successful timeslots
This protocol variant of BB84 discards (on average) 5/8 of the transmitted
timeslots and is worse than the standard protocol in this regard. However, it
offers a slight advantage over the standard BB84 protocol in that an eavesdrop-
per employing a basic intercept/resend strategy causes a higher error rate on
the key data.
Whilst we would not suggest adopting this protocol over the standard oper-
ation of BB84 we note that if the eavesdropper employs a strategy that is opti-
mised for the BB84 protocol with basis revelation then it may not be optimsed
for this adapted BB84 protocol with bit revelation. As both of these protocols
rely on post-processing techniques Alice and Bob can select, at random, which
protocol to operate for a given recorded timeslot. Thus an eavesdropper needs
to optimise any strategy over both protocol variants. Indeed, in general, an
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eavesdropper needs to optimise over all possible post-processing protocols that
Alice and Bob can employ.
Here, of course, we have not undertaken a full security analysis of this alter-
native protocol. If such a protocol were ever required to be used in practice then
a full security analysis is necessary, but it would unduly distract us from the
main point we are making. Here we are using this as an illustration of the flex-
ibility of considering a QKD channel as a quantum ‘experiment’ which simply
collects data. It is the post-processing of this data that gives us the possibil-
ity of bit transport and of randomizing over different choices of post-processing
protocol.
4 QKD Without Public Bit Comparison
In order to detect errors without any public bit comparison Alice and Bob
must operate a duplex QKD channel. That is, Alice transmits photons to Bob,
according to the BB84 protocol, and Bob transmits photons to Alice according
to the BB84 protocol. For convenience we shall imagine these to be interleaved
so that for odd timeslots a photon is transmitted by Alice whereas Bob transmits
in even timeslots. These can, in fact, be two entirely separate transmissions;
all that is required is that we can uniquely correlate a particular transmission
with a particular measurement, which we can achieve using the technique of bit
transport. We can view the duplex channel as being of the form A → R → B
folded back on itself. As above, a full security analysis of this protocol would
unduly detract from the point we are making here; the duplex channel provides
us with an example of another capability unlocked by applying post-processing
techniques such as bit-transport.
It is best to illustrate the technique with an example. The table below
gives an example duplex transmission over 18 timeslots. We assume that each
timeslot is occupied and that each photon reaches its destination. This is,
of course, not true in practice, but it is easy to accommodate timelots where
nothing is transmitted or received. We use a tilde to denote values in even
timeslots (transmissions from Bob to Alice) so that b˜B, for example, would
represent Bob’s transmitted bit value in one of these even timeslots. We also
use the symbol  to denote the bit in situations where Alice and Bob choose a
different coding basis. For clarity we have also reverted to the description of the
coding basis using X or Y rather than using the bit value to denote this choice.
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Timeslot 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
cA X X Y X Y X Y Y X
bA 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
cB Y X Y Y Y X X Y Y
bB  1 0  1 1  1 
c˜B X X Y X X Y Y Y X
b˜B 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
c˜A X Y Y X Y X Y Y X
b˜A 0  1 1   0 1 0
Alice informs Bob of her basis choices for both transmission and measurement.
Bob filters this data into 3 sets. The first is the data for which they expect
no agreement because they have chosen different bases. In the table this first
set consists of timeslots t = 1, 4, 7, 10, 12, 13, 17. Bob informs Alice of these
timeslots and they are discarded. The second and third sets consist of the
remaining odd and even timeslots, respectively. In a perfect world and in the
absence of an eavesdropper, Alice and Bob should have the same recorded tuples
for sets 2 and 3.
In order to check this agreement Bob chooses a timeslot from set 2 and
reads the measured bit value bB from the recorded tuple. He then looks for an
element of set 3 in which his transmitted bit value b˜B = bB. He sends Alice the
t value for these timeslots. Alice compares her bit values b˜A and bA from these
two timeslots. They should be equal. If there are errors on the channel, caused
by an eavesdropper or practical imperfections, then there is a finite probability
that Alice’s comparison will fail. If Bob transmits a sufficient number of these
timeslot pairs from sets 2 and 3 then the probability of an error remaining
undetected can be made negligibly small.
Of course, by revelation of which timeslots have equal values, Bob has leaked
information to any eavesdropper. If the eavesdropper has measured both chan-
nels using a standard intercept/resend strategy in the coding bases, then if only
one of her basis guesses were correct she would know the bit value for both
channels A → B and B → A. Instead of searching for an identical bit value
from sets 2 and 3, Bob could simply look at sequential tuples and transmit an
extra bit of information that tells Alice whether or not to perform a bit flip on
her recorded bit values from set 3. Using the example data from the table we
can see that these sets lead to the following tuples recorded by Bob
Set 2 Set 3
Timeslot bB Timeslot b˜B
3 1 2 0
5 0 6 1
9 1 8 1
11 1 14 0
15 1 16 1
− − 18 0
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After the quantum transmission (or indeed during the quantum transmission,
if so desired) Bob sends Alice a list of tuples
(
t, t˜, f
)
where f ∈ {0, 1} such that
0 means ‘no flip’ and 1 means ‘flip’. For example, if Bob sends Alice the tuple
(3, 2, 1) this means that Alice is to take her data from timeslots 2 and 3 and
flip the recorded bit she has obtained in timeslot 2. We could, equally, require
the data from Alice’s transmission to be flipped instead of the data from Bob’s
transmission; all that is needed is that one of the 2 bits from set 2 or set 3 are
flipped (or not flipped if they should be in agreement). The extra bit that Bob
sends is therefore a parity check bit. Thus in the example transmission above
Bob would send Alice the following list of tuples
(3, 2, 1)
(5, 6, 1)
(9, 8, 0)
(11, 14, 1)
(15, 16, 0)
The parity bit revealed by Bob is, of course, an extra source of potentially useful
information to an eavesdropper. To eliminate this information gain by a passive
Eve, Alice and Bob could adopt the rule that the compared timeslots must be
understood as follows. If the recorded bit values
(
b, b˜
)
are (0, 1) or (0, 0) then
this is taken to be a 0 for the final key. If the recorded bit values
(
b, b˜
)
are (1, 0)
or (1, 1) then this is taken to be a 1 for the final key. An active eavesdropper
performing, for example, a standard intercept/resend strategy in the coding
bases for every timeslot does gain extra information, of course. However, Eve’s
intervention in this case causes an error rate of 3/8.
The actual bit values recorded by Alice and Bob are never publicly revealed,
although 1 bit of information, the parity bit f , is revealed. The fundamental
difference between this protocol and BB84 operated in single link QKD mode, is
that the bit transport mechanism allows Alice and Bob to use their entire filtered
transmission to check for errors, rather than just a random sample which is then
discarded. Alice and Bob, therefore have access to their entire data set, without
compromising their final key, to gather information about what is happening on
the channel between them. Of course they could, if they choose, also perform a
standard random sampling on the data from sets 2 and 3 (discarding timeslots
in which bit values are publicly revealed).
In practice, the duplex technique would not be used to establish a key since
single link QKD can already be operated in such a fashion as to give uncondi-
tional security [11-14]. However, one could imagine situations where this duplex
technique may be useful to obtain extra information about the channel. Indeed,
given that we would envision that in any practical network both Alice and Bob
will have both detection and transmission capability then it costs little extra to
perform duplex transmissions anyway. In the next section we consider a relay
using a different technique employing GHZ-type states which performs a kind
of automatic bit transport.
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5 Relay Key Distribution with GHZ-type States
In the preceding discussion we have assumed a key distribution scheme employ-
ing a BB84 protocol and the transmission of spin-1/2 states. This combination
is one of the most robust practically and can easily be achieved with quasi-single
photon sources and optical fibres. Indeed, commercial QKD systems employing
these mechanisms have been available for a number of years. It could be argued
that the current explosion of interest in quantum information processing was
kick-started by the development of QKD. It is clear that whilst QKD based on
quasi-single photon sources is a robust and practical technology, it is only the
tip of the iceberg as far as the possibilities for the exploitation of quantum me-
chanics in information processing. With increasing advances in the control and
manipulation of entangled sources we expect to see many new and fascinating
technologies emerge in the not too distant future. With this in mind, therefore,
we consider one application of intermediate nodes on a channel that is currently
practically infeasible.
In this application the intermediate node is not really acting as a relay,
as such, but it is interesting because the GHZ-type correlation automatically
achieves some of the features of bit transport. Let us consider an intermediate
node between Alice and Bob who is able to prepare spin-1/2 states in the cor-
related form (and we use a binary notation for the state here, rather than our
previous |±〉)
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|B1, 0〉+ |B3, 1〉)
where |B1〉 and |B3〉 are Bell states given by
|B1〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)
|B3〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)
One of the particles in the Bell states is sent to Alice and its partner to Bob
whilst the intermediary holds on to the remaining particle. A number of such
particles are sent to Alice and Bob in well-defined timeslots. All 3 particles are
stored (technology permitting, of course) for future use. When Alice and Bob
wish to exchange a secret key they inform the intermediary who then makes
a measurement of the spin variable of his stored particle. The intermediary
publishes this list, which is just a random binary bit string, to Alice and Bob
over a public channel.
Alice and Bob, for each particle, then make a spin measurement. The mea-
surement of the intermediary will have projected their particles into either a
correlated state or an anti-correlated state. Accordingly, with the random bi-
nary bit string sent by the intermediary, Alice and Bob can now establish a
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shared secret random bit string from their measurements. For example, if Alice
measures a bit value 1 and this is associated with a bit value of 1 from the bit
string sent by the intermediary, then she knows that Bob will have measured the
bit value 0. They can establish a key from the inferred parity of their measure-
ments. The interesting feature of this scheme is that Alice and Bob need not
communicate directly, nor need they perform their measurements synchronously
(assuming secure storage). Furthermore, they can check whether their particles
are indeed correlated (after the measurement of the intermediary) by choosing
a random sample and checking to see whether the Bell inequality is violated,
although this does require some public communication. Another useful feature
of this scheme is that all of the transmitted particles are used to establish the
key.
As it stands, this scheme is vulnerable to a meet-in-the-middle attack by
an eavesdropper who need only intercept both particles sent to Alice and Bob,
perform a Bell measurement to determine whether the state is correlated or
anti-correlated, and re-transmit the particles in a corresponding Bell state to
Alice and Bob. The Bell measurement of the eavesdropper will project the
intermediary’s spin into the state |0〉 or |1〉 at random. In order to frustrate this
attack, the intermediary randomizes the transmitted particles over the timeslots.
Thus, if the intermediary prepares 5 states for transmission to Alice and Bob,
then Alice’s particle from state 1 could be sent in timeslot 1, with the particle
sent to Bob in timeslot 1 coming from, say, state 4. When Alice and Bob
wish to establish a key the intermediary publishes the random binary string
representing the spin measurements made, and also a list of tuples containing
the information about which timeslots must be associated together. Again we
see the key idea underlying bit transport, that of an intermediary correlating
disparate data sets, finding an application here.
In a functional sense, this scheme is a kind of quantum version of the
Needham-Schroeder protocol [15] for the establishment of keys. The Needham-
Schroeder protocol is at the heart of the Kerberos protocol for the exchange
of symmetric keys. Kerberos, and other classical key management protocols,
will assume a central importance in the advent of a working quantum computer
able to tackle problems of significant input size. We can see that this quantum
protocol is much neater in principle than the classical protocols which require
several challenge-response communications between the parties. Of course such
quantum protocols are beyond the reach of existing technology, but the technol-
ogy advances required to construct a quantum computer of significant capability
may also be instrumental in allowing us to practically implement the more spec-
ulative protocols involving GHZ-type states such as the one we have outlined
here.
In this application, the intermediary must be trusted. This is also true of
the IR relays described above when acting to extend the distance for QKD.
Indeed, in the QKD distance extension application, as described above, if Eve
manages to compromise any one relay, then she will compromise the entire com-
munication. An ingenious scheme [9] using distinct physical paths on a network,
together with secret sharing, can alleviate some of this trust burden. As we now
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discuss, this technique can also be adapted to work on single dedicated paths
containing relays.
6 Trusting the Relays
One of the most attractive features of QKD is its promise of unconditional
security, when correctly implemented to overcome any side-channel attacks (see,
for example, [16]). If we need to add extra trusted relays in order to operate the
technique over the required network distances, then from a security perspective,
the benefit of QKD over conventional key distribution systems becomes much
harder to argue. The protocol operation we have so far discussed means that an
attacker only has to compromise one relay in a channel in order to access the
final key. Using multi-path networks, together with secret-sharing, can alleviate
this problem somewhat [9]. In essence, the distinct network paths between Alice
and Bob can be thought of as shares and the final key obtained by the binary
addition of the keys obtained on the different paths. An attacker, therefore, has
to compromise all paths in order to obtain the final key.
We can achieve the same functionality over a single path containing relays
by creating distinct logical channels on that path. This is best illustrated by an
example. We suppose that our two end users, Alice and Bob, require 3 relays to
effectively span the distance between them and establish a quantum key. The
path is, therefore, of the form
A −→ R1 −→ R2 −→ R3 −→ B
Let us add an additional relay spaced such that any 3 of the 4 relays are sufficient
to span the distance for the purposes of quantum key establishment. With a
suitable re-labelling of the relays the channel is now of the form
A −→ R1 −→ R2 −→ R3 −→ R4 −→ B
Now let us suppose that we operate the relays such that for any transmission
timeslot they ‘drop out’ at random. By drop out here we mean that they
allow the quantum signal to pass through unmeasured and unaffected. If 2 or
more drop out in any one timeslot a quantum key cannot be established on the
path because the quantum signal will not span the distance. If the probability
that any one relay drops out is p, and we assume independent relays, then the
probability that any timeslot will result in a successful transmission is
P (open) = (1− p)4 + 4p (1− p)3 (1)
where we describe such a path as ‘open’. For p = 1/2 we see that 5/16 of
the timeslots, on average, will lead to an open path. However, what Alice and
Bob require is to use only timeslots in which precisely 3 out of the 4 relays are
operational. This is, as we shall see, because they are going to establish their
final key by binary addition of the keys established over the separate logical
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channels in which precisely 3 out of the 4 relays are operational. Thus the
fraction of useful timeslots on average, for Alice and Bob, is given by
f = 4p (1− p)3 (2)
which for p = 1/2 is 1/4. The useful timeslots for Alice and Bob will be
those in which the transmission has been effected by one of the following relay
configurations
A −→ R1 −→ R2 −→ R3 −→ B
A −→ R1 −→ R2 −→ R4 −→ B
A −→ R1 −→ R3 −→ R4 −→ B
A −→ R2 −→ R3 −→ R4 −→ B
If we denote the keys established for each of these logical channels as QKijk
then Alice and Bob will establish their final quantum key QKAB by the simple
expedient of performing the binary addition for these separate quantum keys so
that
QKAB = QK123 ⊕QK124 ⊕QK134 ⊕QK234 (3)
Each key is a share of the final key and only those participants with access
to all shares, in this case Alice and Bob, can recover the final secret key. An
eavesdropper with access to the information of only one relay cannot establish
any information about the final key. An eavesdropper with full control of one
relay might decide to disable the drop out feature so that it is always operational.
However, this can easily be detected by the legitimate network participants by
examination of the quantum data since the relay is then effectively acting as an
eavesdropper performing a standard intercept/resend strategy in each timeslot.
In order to compromise the entire channel the eavesdropper needs to compromise
every relay on the channel. In other words, in order to establish a quantum key,
Alice and Bob need only trust one relay on the channel.
If we couple this technique with the use of distinct physical paths on the
network, then we can see that in order to compromise the key QKAB an eaves-
dropper needs to compromise all of the relays on the network that could be
involved in the transmission between Alice and Bob. Whilst this is theoretically
possible, it is a considerable practical challenge for any eavesdropper. If we also
employ bit transport to enable asynchronous quantum key establishment [8]
then not only must an eavesdropper compromise all the relays on the channel
but must compromise those relays and collect data on all possible paths between
Alice and Bob since the inception of the network. A considerable practical chal-
lenge indeed.
The technique outlined above can clearly be extended to any number of
relays. The important feature is that if we have just enough relays to span the
16
distance then the entire channel is vulnerable to the compromise of a single relay.
If we add just one extra relay, superfluous to our distance spanning requirement,
then we can operate the relays in such a way as to ensure that the channel can
only be compromised if every relay on the channel is compromised. There is
a price, however. If we need n − 1 relays to span the distance then with the
addition of an extra relay and the drop out operation described above, we would
only have a fraction of useful channels for Alice and Bob given by
f = np (1− p)n−1 (4)
Thus if we require 9 relays to span the distance, the addition of a single relay
operated as above with p = 1/2 means that f ≈ 0.01 so that, on average,
approximately only 1 out every 100 timeslots is useful to Alice and Bob in
forming the final key, and this is on the assumption that every timeslot contains
transmissions that reach their destination.
The operation of the relay channel described above is not, of course, the only
way to operate such channels, nor are we limited to adding in only one extra
relay. All that is required for Alice and Bob to be able to establish a final key
is that
(i) Alice and Bob participate in all logical channels
(ii) They ensure that every relay is absent from at least one of the channels
used to form the key
The relays thus have no knowledge of the final key established between Alice
and Bob. Indeed, from a security perspective we might wish to add a relay on
a channel, even when it is not strictly necessary, in order to access this feature.
We might, for example, know that the relays are very secure (consider a relay
placed on a satellite, for example, then practical limitations might make us
more confident that it cannot be compromised). Alice and Bob, for very good
reasons, may still not wish another party to have access to their key. This feature
is particularly important in cases where the provision of a QKD network might
be offered as a managed service by a network operator.
7 Conclusion
QKD is a mature and established practical technology [17] that has been imple-
mented in several large-scale trials (see, for example[18]) as well as commercially.
The current principal limitation on any network implementation is the effective
distance over which the technique is feasible. Overcoming this limitation re-
quires the use of intermediate relays which are conventionally operated in a
link-by-link mode. This reduces the attractiveness of a network solution that
we might wish to claim as providing unconditional security.
Here, we have shown how, with a suitable adaptation, IR relays can be oper-
ated on a QKD network to extend the distance over which successful quantum
17
key exchange can be performed. By introducing the technique of bit transport
we have shown that the size of final key established between Alice and Bob is
unaffected by the introduction of such relays. Bit transport is a powerful tech-
nique for extending the capability and flexibility of QKD networks and moves
the perspective from a sychronous QKD network to that of a network-based
collection of quantum experiments in which the collected data can be used to
establish a key both synchronously or asynchronously. Furthermore, the poten-
tial establishment of quantum keys between any two network nodes also gives
us a pool of data for monitoring purposes, quite independent of any security
application.
The possibility of duplex channels for establishing keys without public rev-
elation is another application of bit transport. This technique also gives us the
capability to use the entire filtered transmission to monitor the channel without
compromising the security of the final key. Some of the features of bit trans-
port can automatically be achieved by using more complex entangled quantum
states such as the GHZ-type state we have considered. Whilst such schemes are
currently impractical they suggest that our exploitation of the capabilities of
quantum networks is still in its infancy, although significant progress is being
made in this direction [19]. Indeed, it is fair to say that a radical revision of our
understanding of information processing has been engendered by the exploita-
tion of quantum mechanics (see, for example, Shor’s seminal paper on quantum
computing [20] which has revolutionised our perspective on computation. Other
examples of the implications of this shift to quantum information can be found
in [21]). It seems to us likely that further significant advances are still to be
made.
Any network node, whether used for routing or to increase the distance over
which a signal can be transmitted, must be trusted. We have discussed here
how the creation of distinct logical channels using a random drop-out technique
can radically alter the trust requirements on the intermediate nodes. This tech-
nique, when coupled with others such as multi-path QKD secret sharing and
asynchronous quantum key establishment, gives us a very powerful methodology
for the operation of a quantum key exchange network. Whilst the commercial
arguments for single link QKD may not be compelling, it is clear that network-
based QKD with the techniques outlined above becomes a commercially more
attractive proposition.
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